Using an agent-based modeling approach we study the temporal dynamics of consumer opinions regarding switching to dynamic electricity tariffs and the actual decisions to switch. We assume that the decision to switch is based on the unanimity of τ past opinions. The resulting model explains why there is such a big discrepancy between consumer opinions, as measured by market surveys, and the actual participation in pilot programs and the adoption of dynamic tariffs. We argue that due to the high indifference level in today's retail electricity markets, customer opinions are very unstable and change frequently. The conducted simulation study shows that reducing the indifference level can result in narrowing the intention-behavior gap. A similar effect can be achieved by decreasing the decision time that a consumer takes to make a decision.
Introduction
Today's energy markets face many challenges. Among them the imbalance between the growing demand for electricity on one hand and the depleting supply of fuels on the other. On top of that, the power system faces an increasing presence of distributed renewable generation and has to cope with the old and often inefficient technical infrastructure and the changing expectations of the societies (Allcott, 2011; EC, 2007 EC, , 2012 . Demand side management and demand response tools (DSM/DR) nowadays attract the attention of the main market players: politicians, system operators, electricity retailers and consumers. A wide range of DSM/DR instruments is being considered, starting from education (encouraging efficient usage of energy), through time-based pricing (time-of-use rates, critical peak pricing, real-time pricing) to incentive-based DR (direct load control, emergency demand response programs, capacity market programs), see e.g. Darby and McKenna (2012) , Faruqui and Sergici (2010) , Gerpott and Mahmudova (2010) and Strbac (2008) .
From this plenitude of DSM/DR tools we focus in this paper on time-based pricing, often referred to as dynamic pricing. The main difference between dynamic pricing and flat, conventional tariffs is the dependence of the price consumers pay for electricity on the actual balance between supply and demand in the wholesale market. With such a tariff the consumer may experience several changes in price levels during the day due to the fluctuations of the exchange established spot price (Faruqui and George, 2005; Thorsens et al., 2012) . Dynamic tariffs have been invented to flatten the curve and to shift the demand from on-peak to off-peak hours. On one hand, the shift of load implies a change in consumer habits and daily routines. On the other, it may be also connected with the reduction of the overall energy consumption. Dynamic tariffs are often supported by the so-called enabling technologies, like smart meters, in-home displays, smart plugs, smart appliances and home area networks (FORSA, 2010; Gerpott and Paukert, 2013; Jongejan et al., 2010; Paetz et al., 2012; Star et al., 2010) . These technologies make the control of the energy consumption easier for the customers. In particular, the appliances are automatically turned on or off, according to the changing electricity price and time ranges.
Dynamic tariffs can bring benefits to consumers (potential savings, satisfaction to be ecological) and to electricity retailers and distribution system operators (lower investment and operational costs). However, as many pilot programs and surveys conducted in the recent years have shown, it is quite difficult to get people really involved and to convince them to actually switch to dynamic tariffs (Allcott, 2011; Duetschke and Paetz, 2013; OFGEM, 2011; Ozaki, 2011; Star et al., 2010) . This situation is due, in the first place, to the general indifference of residential consumers with regard to energy, and electricity tariffs in particular. Secondly, the savings that are attainable in many cases are not impressive enough to encourage more people to enroll in the dynamic pricing programs. Finally, switching to the new tariff is often connected with some discomfort, because of the need to reschedule energy consumption according to price signals from the wholesale power market (ATKearney, 2012; Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Thorsens et al., 2012) . For these reasons large fluctuations in consumer opinions about electricity tariffs can be observed: one day they are in favor and the next they are against due to their general indifferent attitude to the pricing programs (they do not care, they are disengaged, they do not find it interesting and worth their attention). Consumer opinions and final decisions are also influenced by the social impact of their neighbors (people prefer to have the same opinion as the majority of the group) and the external influence or field (e.g. advertising of new pricing programs by some electricity retailers). As a result the intentions to reduce energy consumption do not always translate into decisions or actions. The literature calls this discrepancy between opinions and decisions the intention-behavior gap (Godin et al., 2005; Fennis et al., 2011; Ozaki, 2011; Sheeran, 2002) , the value-action gap (Gadenne et al., 2011) , the KAP-gap (acknowledge-attitudes-practice gap; Rogers, 2003) , the attitude-behavior gap or the belief-behavior gap (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002) .
Empirical studies of consumer behavior are time consuming, costly and generally of limited scope. It is hard to imagine a survey involving a few million retail customers, conducted every day for a period of, say, two years. Agent-based or artificial society models, on the other hand, allow for multi-run experiments conducted under different market conditions and for different agent specifications. Agent-based simulations have been also applied to model the demand side of electricity markets. In most papers, however, the focus has been only on opinions (like in Kowalska-Pyzalska et al., 2013) or no distinction between opinions and decisions has been made at the modeling level. For instance, in the model of Zhang and Nuttall (2011) , when facing a number of options, the one for which a given residential electricity consumer has the greatest intention is his or her preferred option, i.e. it is his or her final decision on which energy supplier to use and whether to choose a smart meter or not. Yet, there are papers that pay attention to the difference between the willingness-to-pay (WTP) and the actual adoption, but consider the market of green, renewable energy, not dynamic tariffs (Diaz-Rainey and Tzavara, 2012; Ozaki, 2011) .
In this study we focus on the difference between consumer opinions (or attitudes) and decisions (or behaviors) regarding switching to dynamic tariffs. Using an agent-based modeling approach, we show how personal attributes, like conformity and indifference, on one hand, and advertising, mass-media education programs and financial incentives, on the other, impact the decision making process of individual electricity consumers.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the results of pilot programs that have been run recently in the U.S. and in Europe and whose aim was to evaluate consumer attitudes towards particular demand response tools. In Section 3 we first discuss the innovation diffusion phenomenon as a five-stage process, which includes, among others, the persuasion stage (forming and attitude or opinion) and the decision stage (adoption). Next, we focus on the behavioral aspects of the transition from opinions to decisions, in particular, in the context of energy conservation. In Section 4 we concentrate on the opinion-to-decision transition algorithm we use in this study and briefly review the underlying agent-based model of opinion formation, originally introduced in Przybyła et al. (2013) and adopted to the case of electricity consumers in Kowalska-Pyzalska et al. (2013) . In Section 5 we present the results of our simulation study. Finally, in Section 6 we wrap up the results and discuss policy implications.
Pilot programs
The rapidly increasing number of distributed generators, like renewable energy sources (RES) or cogeneration, has recently led to a change in the philosophy of power system architecture and operation and the introduction of smart grids. The latter idea is closely related to DSM/DR tools, which have been known for years, but nowadays attract much more attention. At the same time the EU long-term strategy and climate policy call for an increase of energy efficiency, an increase of market penetration by RES and a reduction of CO2 emissions in the coming years. Among EU regulations, Directive 2012/27/EC paves the way for widespread introduction of smart meters that would provide feedback to private households on their energy consumption and information about energy efficiency (EC, 2012) .
In order to achieve the ambitious goals set by the EU, a durable change in consumer attitudes and behavior is needed. Without consumer willingness to adopt to dynamic tariffs and without their effort to reduce energy consumption, the efficiency of energy usage will not increase significantly. In the last 10 years a number of pilot programs and surveys in the U.S. and Europe were conducted in order to measure and evaluate the reduction of peak demand and energy conservation at the consumption level (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010; Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Jongejan et al., 2010; Sopha et al., 2011; Star et al., 2010) . Many of those experiments were run in an attempt to understand consumers' responsiveness to variation in retail electricity prices (Allcott, 2011; ATKearney, 2012; Faruqui and George, 2005; Grans et al., 2013; Ozaki, 2011; Thorsens et al., 2012) .
Switching from a traditional tariff to a dynamic one has been found to reduce peak demand up to 44%, especially when accompanied by enabling technologies (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010) . However, the cost of the enabling technologies is currently higher than potential savings (Gerpott and Paukert, 2013; Jongejan et al., 2010; Paetz et al., 2012) . The pilot programs have also revealed another unwanted feature. Namely, only a small fraction of the program participants decides to sign up for dynamic tariffs after the pilot programs are ended. For instance, the AIU Power Smart Pricing Program in Illinois has shown that only 18% of customers, where the pilot program was run, were aware of it. Then, only 10% of them understood the program and only 5% were interested in the program. In the end, under 1% of customers enrolled in the program (Star et al., 2010) . Similar survey results have been obtained in other pilot programs in North America and Western Europe, in countries where the societies are rather aware of and sensitive to environmental issues. Most of those surveys have shown that people are generally indifferent to energy conservation. According to a survey conducted in 2010 in the U.K. only 8% of respondents think that energy needs 'attention and improvement ' (OFGEM, 2010) . The report of ATKearney (2012) shows that 60-75% of consumers are not aware of the existence of smart grids and are not willing to shift their consumption to off-peak hours. Similar results have been obtained in Germany (FORSA, 2010; Gerpott and Paukert, 2013; Paetz et al., 2012) .
The difference between stated willingness-to-pay (WTP) or stated willingness-to-adopt (SWA) and the actual adoption has been also investigated in the context of green energy (Diaz-Rainey and Tzavara, 2012; Ozaki, 2011; Scarpa and Willis, 2010; Zarnikau, 2003) . High rates of willingnessto-pay for green energy have been found in the U.S. (WTP between 40% and 70%) and in most of the European countries (SWA between 30% and 60%). However, at the same time the actual adoption, i.e. the number of electricity consumers that have actually switched to green tariffs, is relatively low. In the U.S. the average adoption rates are estimated to be at or below 2% (with the exception of some best performing regional programs, where rates between 5% and 17% have been achieved), whereas in Europe these rates are even lower, see Diaz-Rainey and Tzavara (2012) . Baddeley (2011) reports that 52% of Americans claim to support the Kyoto Treaty in principle, but at the same time if they had to pay extra $50 per month they would oppose it. Another survey in Italy showed that while 70% of respondents are willing to increase energy savings, only 2% are currently reducing their use (Pongiglione, 2011) . This huge discrepancy between intentions and actions, in particular related to electricity tariffs, will be the focus of the following Section.
3. Intention-behavior gap and electricity tariffs
Attitudes and behaviors
Attitudes can be understood as a personal belief regarding the consequences of undertaking a specific behavior as a function of the personal valuation of the consequences (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005) . In other words, attitudes toward something are favorable or unfavorable evaluative reactions -whether exhibited in beliefs, feelings, or inclinations to act (Myers, 2013) . In this study we talk about consumer opinions regarding electricity tariffs. These opinions are understood as consumers' attitudes towards dynamic pricing and energy conservation. Formulation of the opinion in favor of or against an energy-related issue is influenced by several factors, like personal age, gender, culture, economic and social status, environmental norms and beliefs, social impact of the community (the opinions of the neighbors, family and friends), information, advertising and incentives provided by mass-media and product sellers (Allcott, 2011; Gadenne et al., 2011; Nolan et al., 2008; Ozaki, 2011; Pongiglione, 2011; Stern, 2000; Zhang and Nuttall, 2011) . Being dependent on so many internal and external factors, the volatility of the opinion may be huge. The opinion may change easily, even on a daily basis. One day a person can be in favor of energy conservation, because he or she wants to be seen as pro-environmental or because others are doing it. A few days later the same person can be against, because of the economic barriers (like investment costs and limited savings) and discomfort of usage (changing the lifestyle).
On the other side of the decision making process is behavior, understood as an action taken after making a certain decision. In the context of the adoption of dynamic pricing there can be two opposing decisions: to switch to the dynamic tariff or to stay with (or go back to) the old, flat tariff. The transition from an opinion to a decision can be described by a typical innovation adoption process. Rogers (2003) identifies five sequential stages of this process:
1. knowledge stage -gain knowledge of an innovation, 2. persuasion stage -form an attitude (opinion) towards it, 3. decision stage -decide to adopt or reject it, 4. implementation stage -implement it, 5. confirmation stage -confirm the decision.
As long as only the first three stages are taken into consideration, we may talk about formulation of an opinion. Before the opinion is formulated, the person is influenced by information from mass-media, education, product or idea sellers and the social network. In the context of electricity pricing programs the information about dynamic tariffs and enabling technologies originates from electricity suppliers and spreads to consumers through advertising (i.e. a global field) and the social network via word of mouth (i.e. local interactions). However, even if an individual is aware of an innovation, he or she may not regard it relevant to his or her situation or potentially useful. Secondly, the information obtained must be sufficient enough to enable formulation of the opinion regarding the innovation. Thus, if the new idea is found not relevant to the personal situation and/or the knowledge obtained is not sufficient to get the person adequately informed, then the spreading stops at the first knowledge stage and the attitude towards the innovation is not formed. Further, as Rogers (2003) notices, the main outcome of the persuasion stage in the innovation-decision process is a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the innovation. In this context, Deffuant et al. (2005) define a preadoption state when an interested individual is ready to adopt, but takes reflection time to be sure of the decision. During this period, social influences may change his or her interest and potentially lead to not adopting the innovation. Then, only if the fourth stage is achieved, the decision is really made and implemented. There can be two main options: either adoption, understood as a decision to make full use of an innovation, or rejection, understood as a decision not to adopt an innovation. Finally, each decision should be confirmed. It may happen, that after the decision is made, the individual will not be satisfied with the choice, he or she had made. The individual may suffer from dissonance or internal disequilibrium, which is an uncomfortable state of mind that an individual tries to reduce or eliminate, e.g. by discontinuing the innovation.
Empirical evidence indicates that the innovation adoption process quite often ends at some of the intermediate stages. The initial intentions to adopt the innovation, e.g. reduce energy consumption, do not always translate into decisions or actions. The literature calls this discrepancy between opinions and decisions the intention-behavior gap (Godin et al., 2005; Fennis et al., 2011; Ozaki, 2011; Sheeran, 2002) , the value-action gap (Gadenne et al., 2011) , the KAP-gap (acknowledgeattitudes-practice gap; Rogers, 2003) , the attitude-behavior gap or the belief-behavior gap (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002) . Such a gap is often observed in health related behaviors , however, it seems that this phenomenon is most pronounced for environmental attitudes and behavior (Dunlap et al., 2000; Gadenne et al., 2011) . There are many internal and external factors that affect consumer behavior in such situations and it can be really difficult to identify the exact reasons for why the gap exists. In the case of green energy, for instance, Diaz-Rainey and Tzavara (2012) and Ozaki (2011) argue that the intention-behavior gap can be to some extent explained by (i) unstable opinions (due to lack of knowledge, confusion generated by the complex structure of tariffs, lack of guidelines and advice, high consumer indifference), (ii) hesitancy in switching electricity suppliers and high searching costs, (iii) lack of sufficient supply (offers that satisfy consumer needs and expectations) and (iv) the free rider problem.
Transition from opinions to decisions
For many years the issues, if and how attitudes influence human behavior and in reverse, if and how this behavior impacts human attitudes, have been discussed by psychologists, sociologists, economists, marketing and sales experts and politicians. Empirical observations suggest that depending on the circumstances, the relationship between attitude statements and behavior can range from no relationship to a strong one (Myers, 2013) . For innovations we would like to assume that the persuasion stage leads to a behavioral change: adoption or rejection of the innovation, consistent with the individual's attitude. However, in the case of energy conservation and dynamic tariffs, attitudes and actions may be disparate (recall the results of the AIU Power Smart Pricing Program, see Star et al., 2010) . The formation of a favorable or an unfavorable attitude toward an innovation does not always lead directly or indirectly to an adoption or rejection.
Referring to a number of surveys regarding attitudes and behavior, Myers (2013) concludes that one's attitude will predict one's behavior, only if three conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, to examine the attitude's impact on the behavior, other influences should be minimized. In order to achieve this goal the principle of aggregation can be used. Namely, the effects of an attitude on behavior become more apparent, when we look at a person's aggregate or average behavior rather than at isolated acts, see also Ajzen and Fishbein (2005) . If we want to observe what is the relation between opinions and the final decision, for instance whether to choose the new dynamic tariff or stay with the old one, the opinions should be averaged over a certain period of time. Secondly, the attitude should correspond very closely to the predicted behavior. For example, attitudes toward recycling (but not general attitudes toward environmental issues) predict participation in recycling.
In our case this means that both -opinions and decisions -have to refer to switching to a dynamic tariff or energy conservation, not to environmental issues in general. Finally, the attitude must be potent, because something reminds us of it or because we acquired it by direct experience. For dynamic pricing adoption this means that the opinions should be persistent to lead to a decision. Consumers have to be really convinced before making a decision, like in the model of Deffuant et al. (2005) . Here, social influence and information gathered from mass-media and energy retailers plays a great role.
Theories in social and health psychology often assume that intentions cause behaviors (Gollwitzer, 1999; Webb and Sheeran, 2006) . Among them, the theory of a planned behavior of Ajzen and Fishbein (2005) is a very popular one and useful in the context of understanding the relation between environmental attitudes and energy conservation (Gadenne et al., 2011; Godin et al., 2005; Pickett-Baker and Ozaki, 2008; Rodriguez-Barreiro et al., 2013; Zhang and Nuttall, 2011) . According to this theory, attitudes are important to the behavior, but they do not determine behavior directly. Attitudes influence behavioral intentions, which in turn shape our actions. When facing a number of options, a person prefers the one, for which he or she has the greatest intention. However, even though intentions are believed to be the best predictor of behavior, they account for less than one third of the variance in behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Webb and Sheeran, 2006) . According to Gollwitzer (1999) , in addition to strong goal intentions, so-called implementation intentions or plans concerning where, when and how one will perform the intended behavior, are required to overcome the intention-behavior gap, see also Fennis et al. (2011) .
Antecedents of behavioral change in case of energy conservation
For a number of years energy consumption behavior has been examined from various perspectives, including microeconomics (rational choice models, pricing, market structure), behavioral economics (bounded rationality, decision heuristics), technology adoption (diffusion theories, cognitive dissonance, theory of planned behavior), social and environmental psychology (influence of information, pro-environmental attitudes, value-belief-norm) and sociology (organizational behavior), see e.g. Baddeley (2011 ), Pongiglione (2011 ), Rodriguez-Barreiro et al. (2013 and Stephenson et al. (2010) . Each of these theories and models examines the relation between attitudes and decisions from a different point of view. However, the literature agrees that consumer environmental behavior is strongly connected not only with general environmental beliefs and attitudes, but also with environmental norms, drivers and barriers of environmental behavior, social or community influence and government policy. Some of the most important antecedents of behavioral change regarding energy conservation and dynamic pricing include:
• General environmental beliefs and attitudes. The presence of the intention-behavior gap indicates that there is no direct relationship between environmental beliefs, attitudes and behavior. Although pro-environmental values are supposed to impact pro-environmental behavior, they do not necessarily do that (Gadenne et al., 2011; Pickett-Baker and Ozaki, 2008) . If the attitudes are too general (e.g. if they refer to environmental protection in general, but not precisely to energy conservation), they are not likely to influence the reduction in electricity consumption.
• Environmental norms. The influence of norms on the attitudes and behavior is emphasized in the value-belief-norm theory of Stern (2000) . According to this theory, normative beliefs have a positive effect on the intention to adopt environmental behavior. As Ozaki (2011) argues, recycling is a good example how an environmental issue can become a normative behavior. The more consumers are convinced that waste segregation is good for the environment and start doing it, the higher is the probability that such a behavior will become a norm and that other people will adopt this practice.
• Environmental drivers and barriers. Environmental drivers include procedural knowledge and understanding (which is necessary to turn beliefs into concrete actions, see Gyberg and Palm, 2009; Pongiglione, 2011; Stern, 2000) , consumer feelings of guilt or moral obligation, sense of social responsibility, ease of adoption and personal relevance. On the other hand, the strongest environmental barriers include large initial investment costs, expected long pay-back time, insufficient information, lack of professional help and advice, lack of time (Gadenne et al., 2011; Sidiras and Koukios, 2004 ).
• Social influence. Many studies have shown that normative social influence has a positive effect on the intention to engage in environmental behaviors, like the acceptance of green energy or energy conservation behavior (see e.g. Allcott, 2011; Ayres et al., 2013; Gangale et al., 2013; Jager, 2006; McMichael and Shipworth, 2013; Ozaki, 2011; Pickett-Baker and Ozaki, 2008; Schultz et al., 2007; Sidiras and Koukios, 2004) . As Nolan et al. (2008) argue, in the context of energy conservation social norms have a greater impact than other non-normative motivations like protection of the environment, benefiting the society or even saving money. Moreover, they reveal an inconsistency between stated motivation and actual behavior. 'Because others are doing it' was judged to be the least important reason at the self-reported motivation stage. But the highest correlation with actual energy conservation behavior had the respondents' belief whether or not their neighbors were doing it. Further, as Rogers (2003) mentions, all innovations carry some degree of uncertainty for an individual, who is typically unsure of the new idea's functioning and thus seeks social reinforcement from others of his or her attitude toward the innovation. The individual wants to know whether his or her thinking is on the right track in the opinion of peers. At the persuasion stage and at the decision stage, an individual seeks innovation evaluation information, messages that reduce uncertainty about an innovation's expected consequences. This type of information is usually gathered by individuals from nearby peers, whose subjective opinions on the innovation (based on their personal experience with adoption of the new idea) are more accessible and convincing to them (Bollinger and Gilingham, 2012; Fehr and Fischbacheri, 2002 ).
• Government policies and subsidies. Financial incentives, grants, discounts, subsidies, etc., can be helpful in changing consumer behavior, but they are not enough. They should go along with some of the other factors: pro-environmental attitudes, social influence and lack of environmental barriers.
The model

Bridging the gap -from opinions to decisions
To summarize the discussion of Section 3 we may conclude that an individual's decision regarding an innovation is not an instantaneous act but rather a complex process that occurs over time. At least two separate mechanisms, which affect the process, should be distinguished: change of opinions (or attitudes) and decision making. In Kowalska-Pyzalska et al. (2013) we have focused on the first mechanism and proposed an agent-based model of opinion dynamics, where electricity consumers face the problem of switching to innovative dynamic tariff programs (and potentially back to the original flat tariffs). Here we propose an extension of the model which bridges the gap between opinions and decisions, and addresses the second mechanism -the adoption of dynamic pricing.
As previously, we consider a social system represented by a square grid (i.e. a lattice, a chessboard) L × L. Each site of the grid is occupied by an agent (a household) characterized by opinion S i = ±1. Following Nyczka and Sznajd-Weron (2013) and Przybyła et al. (2013) , we call these agents spinsons (= 'spin' + 'person') to reflect their dichotomous nature originating in spin models of statistical physics and humanly features and interpretation. If S i = −1 the spinson prefers the old flat tariff, if S i = +1 it prefers the new dynamic tariff. Because we are studying the diffusion of innovation, i.e. diffusion of the new dynamic tariff, we assume that initially all spinsons have opinion S i = −1, i.e. all pay for consumed electricity according to the flat tariff.
In subsequent time steps a spinson's opinion can change according to a set of rules put forward by Kowalska-Pyzalska et al. (2013) , see also Przybyła et al. (2013) and Section 4.2. Based on its opinion the spinson makes a decision to adopt (D i = +1) or reject (D i = −1) the innovation (i.e. the dynamic tariff). The assumption that an opinion (intention, attitude) influences the decision is consistent with the majority of theories that explain consumer's acceptance of new technologies, see Section 3 for a discussion and references. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, one established theory on how exactly a decision is made still does not exist. It is known, however, that substantial time -usually measured in months -elapses between the time when the consumer becomes aware of the product and when he or she actually purchases it (Greenleaf and Lehmann, 1995; Rogers, 2003) . Therefore, we assume that a spinson must posses a consistent opinion for a certain period of time τ to make a decision. In other words, at time t a spinson decides to:
• adopt the innovation -switch to the dynamic tariff, if currently using the flat tariff, or stay with the dynamic tariff, i.e. D i (t) = +1 if its opinion was positive over certain period of time
• reject the innovation -switch back to the flat tariff, if currently using the dynamic tariff, or stay with the flat tariff, i.e. D i (t) = −1 if its opinion was negative over certain period of time
A similar mechanism has been considered by Deffuant et al. (2005) in an extension of a model initially targeted at the diffusion of green practices among farmers in the EU (Deffuant et al., 2002) . A preadoption state was defined in which an interested individual was ready to adopt, but took reflection time to be sure of the decision. During this period, social influences may have changed his or her interest and potentially led to not adopting the innovation. If the individual remained 'interested' during a given number of time steps (τ = 15 in the original paper) he or she adopted. 'Interest' was defined as a three state variable ('no', 'maybe' or 'yes') and its value was dependent on the global opinion and uncertainty in the society.
The underlying model of opinion formation
Of course an individual's opinion is generally not constant and changes over time due to autonomy that breaks determinism (indifference, independence), social influence and rationality related to product features. In this study we use the opinion formation model proposed by Przybyła et al. (2013) and adapted to the case of electricity tariffs by Kowalska-Pyzalska et al. (2013) , which addresses all three aspects. In particular, at time t the opinion of a spinson depends on three factors:
• Indifference -which introduces indetermination in the system through an autonomous behavior of the individuals. In the case of indifference the spinson is immune to the influence of its neighbors and the global field (advertising, mass media). This kind of behavior can arise if two options (e.g. traditional and dynamic electricity tariffs) offer both advantages and disadvantages and these advantages and disadvantages are not clearly comparable (Boudon and Bourricaud, 2003) . With probability p an agent is indifferent and takes a purely random opinion, independently of the neighboring spinsons and product features.
• Conformity -according to empirical observations social pressure, that results from interactions between neighbors, has to be taken into account when considering electricity tariffs (Allcott, 2011; Ayres et al., 2013; Nolan et al., 2008 ). In our model the nature of these interactions is motivated by the psychological observations of the social impact dating back to Asch (1955) : if a group of spinson's neighbors unanimously shares an opinion, the spinson will also accept it. We consider 2 × 2 panels of four spinsons, which is a natural choice for this kind of 'outflow dynamics' on 2D lattices (Galam, 2012; Sznajd-Weron, 2005 ).
• Product features -which are modeled by a global field. The strength of the field h depends on features of the new dynamic electricity tariff: potential savings, (dis)comfort of usage, intensity of advertising, etc. As in Sznajd-Weron and Weron (2003), with probability h the spinson, who has not been influenced by its neighbors, can gain a positive attitude towards the new dynamic electricity tariff.
Regarding conformity, note that a different idea has been proposed by Galam (2005) , who used a local majority rule with bias instead of unanimity. It turns out that the macroscopic behavior of the system is qualitatively different and richer if we assume that social influence takes place in the case of unanimity (Nyczka and Sznajd-Weron, 2013) . It is also better motivated by social experiments.
Model parameters
As seen from the above description, the expanded model of opinion formation and decision making is characterized by three parameters:
1. p ∈ [0, 1] -the level of indifference. Generally p be could be different for each spinson and express the fact that customers are not identical and have individual, potentially different levels of autonomy. However, in this paper we assume that p is equal for all spinsons and, therefore, can be treated as a certain average value in the society. 2. h ∈ [0, 1] -the strength of the external influence. Similarly as p, the strength of the field h could be different for each spinson reflecting the fact that product features (such as potential savings, (dis)comfort of usage) are not equally important for all customers. But again we assume that it has a constant value for all spinsons and expresses a certain average value for the society. 3. τ ∈ [0, ∞] -the time delay needed to make a decision, so-called decision time (Greenleaf and Lehmann, 1995) or reflection time (Deffuant et al., 2005) . We use a single value of τ for the whole population, which should be treated as an average decision time. In this paper we present results for τ = 30 and 60.
We study the model running M Monte Carlo simulations. A single experiment consists of T Monte Carlo steps (MCS), which can be interpreted in terms of time intervals, e.g. days. In each MC step, N = L × L elementary sub-steps are repeated to ensure that on average each spinson is chosen once in a single MCS (see Landau and Binder, 2005 , for an excellent guide to MC simulations). The simulations were performed on a square lattice 100 × 100 (which corresponds to N = 10000 spinsons) and the results were averaged over M = 1000 experiments.
Results
The time evolution of the opinion formation process and the dependence on model parameters have been thoroughly analyzed in Kowalska-Pyzalska et al. (2013) . The model has been shown not only to reproduce the S -shaped curve representing the time change of the number of consumers having adopted to a new product, but also to describe two other phenomena that are crucial for the diffusion of innovation -existence of the so-called critical mass (Oliver and Marwell, 1985; Rogers, 2003) and the valley-of-death (Weyant, 2011) . Probably the most important conclusion from the study of Kowalska-Pyzalska et al. (2013) was that the adoption of dynamic electricity tariffs was virtually impossible due to the high level of indifference in today's societies. Although we have been dealing only with opinions, our conjecture was stronger -for a high level of indifference, the fluctuation of an agent's opinion leads to his/her inability to make a decision and switch to a new dynamic tariff, no matter how strong is the influence of the external field. In this paper we verify our predictions by expanding our model to incorporate actual decisions. To attain this goal we concentrate on quantifying the relationship between opinions and decisions.
In Figures 1 and 2 we plot the dependence between opinions or decisions and the indifference level (0 < p ≤ 1) for four values of the external field (h = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4). Note that the results were averaged over M = 1000 experiments (or trajectories). The decision to switch to the dynamic tariff is made based on the current and (τ − 1) past opinions. To change the decision from D i (t) = −1 to D i (t) = 1, the opinions must have been in favor of the dynamic tariff, i.e. S i (t) = 1, for at least a month (τ = 30) in Figure 1 , and at least two months (τ = 60) in Figure 2 .
It can be noticed that the external field has a significant impact on the opinions and the resulting decisions only if the indifference level is rather low (p < 0.2). If the indifference level is high, say p > 0.5, the external field does not influence too much the opinions nor the decisions. If the decision (or reflection) time is longer (τ = 60, as in Fig. 2 ) the ratio of decisions to switch to the dynamic tariff is even lower, no matter how strong is the external field.
Furthermore, lower left panels in both figures indicate that with high indifference, independently of the level of the external field, the ratio of spinsons having a positive opinion towards the dynamic tariff converges to 0.5. At the same time, the ratio of decisions is close to 0, see the lower right panels in Figs. 1 and 2 . The decisions are compatible with the opinions, only if the indifference level is rather low, say p < 0.4. Otherwise the intention-behavior gap can be observed: even if the opinions (attitudes) toward the dynamic tariff are in majority, they do not translate into decisions to adopt the innovation. This is more visible for the longer decision time, i.e. for τ = 60. For instance, for indifference p = 0.3, about 75% of spinsons have a positive attitude towards the dynamic tariff, while only under 3% actually decide to adopt the innovation, see the upper right panel in Fig. 2 . For p > 0.5 the ratio of spinsons that adopt is negligible, despite the ratio of opinions in excess of 0.5. For the shorter decision time (τ = 30, as in Fig. 1 ) this effect is less pronounced, yet also then the intention-behavior gap is clearly visible. This phenomenon is due to the fact that opinions are unstable. One day a spinson is in favor of dynamic pricing, e.g. because of potential financial savings, and the next day it is against it, e.g. because of the discomfort caused by shifting the consumption to off-peak hours and changing the lifestyle. The bottom panels in Figures 1 and 2 also imply that the external field, even a relatively high one (h = 0.4), does not lead to a significant increase in the ratio of decisions in favor of the new dynamic tariff. When the level of indifference in the society is high, the social network and external field have no significant influence on the adoption rate. On the other hand, if the indifference level is low we can observe a somewhat surprising phenomenon -a reverse situation, where the number of spinsons that have adopted is larger than the number of spinsons having a positive attitude towards dynamic pricing. This phenomenon is better visible for shorter reflection times, see the upper panels in Fig. 1 for τ = 30 and compare with the upper panels in Fig. 2 for τ = 60. This 'reverse gap' can be explained by the fact that for small p the fluctuations (i.e. the noise) in the system are relatively small and advertising (combined with conformity) easily convinces spinsons to adopt. The smaller the decision time the faster is the convergence of the system to a steady state. This can be seen in the time evolution plots of the adoption rate in Fig.  3 . For τ = 15 a 'nearly steady state' for p ≈ 0.2 is reached after ca. 150 MCS, for τ = 30 after ca. 500 MCS, while for τ = 60 not before 1200 MCS. The opinion fluctuations that take place afterward are not strong or long-lasting enough for the spinsons to revert back to the old tariff (i.e. to abandon the innovation). Hence, the observed 'reverse gap'. On the other hand, for larger indifference, say p > 0.5, convergence to the steady state is much slower, see . Opinions (lower right) are the driver of adoption decisions, irrespective of τ. Note that opinions stabilize -approach the steady staterelatively quickly. In particular, for high indifference levels the average opinion does not deviate too much from 0.5, no matter how long is the observation time. τ = 60 -and even for τ = 30 -the system does not reach a true steady state. Nevertheless, the changes in decisions are so small that from a practical perspective they are negligible. Therefore the intention-behavior gap does not vanish over time.
Conclusions and policy implications
Using an agent-based modeling approach we have studied the temporal dynamics of consumer opinions regarding switching to dynamic electricity tariffs and the actual decisions to switch. By expanding a relatively simple model of opinion dynamics to incorporate adoption decisions as a function of past opinions, we have been able to explain why there is such a big discrepancy between consumer opinions, as measured by market surveys, and the actual participation rate in pilot programs and the adoption of dynamic tariffs. In an extensive simulation study we have found that for moderate and high values of indifference (as measured by p), no matter how intensive is advertising (i.e. external field h), we obtain the empirically observed intention-behavior gap between opinions and decisions. Moreover, the longer is the decision (or reflection) time, the larger is the gap. On the other hand, for low levels of indifference and a sufficient level of advertising, the opinions and decisions are closely related. Interestingly, as shown in Section 5, for a certain range of model parameters the adoption rate may even exceed the average opinion level in the society. Due to a high indifference level in today's retail electricity markets, customer opinions are very unstable and change frequently. This may hamper the adoption of new dynamic tariffs, because consumers typically need some sense of certainty before they take an action, especially if the cost and consequences of such an action (changes in lifestyle, investments in new equipment, etc.) are significant. The conducted simulation study shows that reducing the indifference level can result in narrowing the intention-behavior gap. On the other hand, a similar effect could be obtained by shortening the decision time. Interestingly, a similar phenomenon has been observed by Galam (2006) with respect to the highly unexpected victory of the 'no' to the 2005 French referendum on the European constitution. The long public debate resulted in a switch from initially positive attitudes to eventually negative decisions.
In light of these results and of the pilot programs conducted in the U.S. and Europe, we can derive an important policy recommendation: as long as the indifference level of the retail consumers is not reduced or the decision time to switch to the dynamic tariff is shortened, the efforts to smooth the electricity demand via dynamic tariffs will not bring the expected results. In order to overcome the first part of the problem, utility companies should cooperate with the policy makers, governments and ecological organizations. In particular, the following steps could be taken:
• communicate to consumers the potential benefits of adoption at social and personal levels,
• provide clear and full information to consumers -to reduce the confusion and to increase the interest in dynamic pricing and other DSM/DR tools,
• increase public awareness of the problem.
An alternative or parallel action to narrow the gap between opinions and decisions would be to shorten the decision time. For instance,
• by providing enough incentives that will overcome the cost and discomfort when switching to a new tariff,
• by making the process of signing the contract easier for the consumer (e.g. via internet),
• finally, by offering consumers an easy return to the old contract, in case the new tariff will not satisfy their needs.
When customers engage more in the topic or their decision time is shortened, the adoption of dynamic electricity tariffs will be much more likely. Then in the future, when the indifference level and/or the decision time are reduced, the external field (i.e. tariff pricing schemes, advertising, etc.) will become the focal point. Finally, we should make clear that the above mentioned results have been obtained within a relatively simple agent-based model. However, as Deffuant et al. (2003) argue complicated models are not necessarily more realistic than simple ones. (...) A close link to the social sciences is not a guarantee of realism either. The current state of the social sciences shows a lot of different schools in competition, without any clear recognized paradigm providing generic rules of individual or collective behavior. (...) To summarize, making complicated models is very easy. Establishing strong results about their dynamical properties and relating them to evidence from psychology or sociology is the difficult part. We argue that the study of simple approximations is a good strategy for progress in this direction. 
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